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1. Introduction
This paper provides estimates of domestic and international dynamic effects
of changes in government spending, in the post-Bretton Woods era, and it
seeks to interpret these effects, using a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of a two-country world.
Several recent papers have used time-series methods to estimate
impulse responses of
t d · 1governmen spen lng.
domestic macroeconomic variables to changes
The present paper extends that literature
in
by
investigating
shocks, using
the international repercussions
2
vector autoregressions (VARs).
of government
Specifically,
purchases
the paper
studies the transmission of shocks of this type between the U. S. and an
aggregate of the remaining G7 countries (G6, henceforth), during the
post-Bretton Woods era. The paper confirms earlier research that showed
that an increase in government purchases in a given country raises output
in that country. The results here suggest that the effects on foreign
output are likewise positive. The multiplier of domestic and foreign output
to a country-specific shock to government purchases ranges between 1 and 2,
eight to twelve quarters after the shock. A country-specific increase in
government purchases likewise raises domestic and foreign private
consumption (the multiplier of domestic and foreign non-durables and
services consumption is smaller than unity), and it tends to reduce the
domestic and foreign price level and nominal interest rate. The data
suggest also that an increase in U.S. government purchases reduces U.S. net
exports and that it induces a nominal depreciation of the U. S. dollar
(against a G6 currency basket), roughly 8 to 12 quarters after the rise in
U.S. government purchases.
The theoretical model presented in this paper assumes a flexible
nominal exchange rate, full international integration of bond markets, and
overlapping price and wage contracts a la Calvo (1983). Physical capital
accumulation and endogenous household labor supply are assumed. It builds
l E.g ., Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Blanchard and Perotti (1998), Fatas
and Mihov (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1989, 1992).
2There has been little empirical research on this issue. Bryant et
al. (1988) compare simulation results for international effects of
government purchases, obtained from large traditional macroeconometric
models. Their results are heavily dependant on the theoretical set-up
assumed in their analysis. Ahmed et al. (1993) study international business
cycles, using VARs that include government purchases, but they do not
report estimates of the international effects of these purchases. Chinn
(1999) provides empirical evidence on the relationship between government
spending and real exchange rates.
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on recent research on quantitative (calibrated) dynamic-optimizing general
equilibrium models with money and sticky prices and wages; see, e.g.,
Beaudry and Devereux (1995), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998), Betts and
Devereux (1997), Kollmann (1997, 1999) .3 That work has abstracted from
fiscal policy shocks,4
The model predicts that a permanent rise in government purchases in a
given country, say the 'home' country, raises output, labor supply and
capi tal investment and the price level, in that country, while private
consumption and net exports fall. Also, the home country experiences a
nominal and real depreciation of its currency. Foreign output and
investment rise likewise, although much less than home output and
investment. The intuition for the responses of home output, investment and
consumption is that a rise in home government purchases has a negative
wealth effect for home country private households (given the increase in
taxes required to finance the rise in government purchases), which induces
these households to increase their labor supply (provided leisure is a
5
normal good), and to consume less. Hence, home output rises; home
investment rises likewise, as the increase in the labor input raises the
marginal product of capital. The fact that the supply of foreign goods
rises more strongly than that of home goods explains why the relative price
3See also the related work by, i.a., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Hau
(1998), Zhu (1998), Monacelli (1998), Ghironi (1998).
4Fiscal policy shocks, in a dynamic-optimizing setting with nominal
rigidities are studied by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Pesenti and Corsetti
(1998) and Tille (1998) but their models are more stylized than that
developed in the paper here. Related analyses of the effect of fiscal
policy shocks are also presented by McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and Laxton et
al. (1998) who use multi-country models with nominal inertia that combine
elements of dynamic-optimizing behavior with standard Keynesian features;
these models do not allow for the endogenous labor supply responses to
government spending shocks that play a key role in the model developed
below, Frenkel and Razin (1992), Backus et al. (1995), Baxter (1995), Yi
(1993), Bianconi (1996), Turnovsky (1997), Kollmann (1991, 1998a), i.a.,
study two-country dynamic-optimizing trade models with shocks to government
purchases, but that work abstracts from money and nominal rigidities (for
closely related work on the effect of government purchases shocks in closed
economies without nominal rigidities see, 1. a., Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), Baxter and King (1993), Braun and McGrat tan (1993), Gal i (1994);
Olivei (1998) analyzes fiscal policy in a closed economy model with nominal
rigidities); also, these analyses assume a world with a single good, i.e.
these models are not suited for analyzing the response of the exchange rate
to government purchases (an exception is Frenkel and Razin (1992) whose
analysis focuses on two-period models).
5Baxter and King (1993) showed that, in a neo-classical model, an
increase in government purchases induces a rise in output, because of the
wealth effect of that increase on the labor supply.
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of home produced goods falls, which helps understand why the home country
experiences a real (and nominal) exchange rate depreciation. The rise in
government purchases induces also a rise in foreign output. Qualitatively,
the mechanism that was just outlined operates irrespective of whether
prices and wages are fully flexible, or whether prices and/or wages are
sticky. However, when prices are sticky, home (and foreign) output respond
more strongly to a rise in government purchases. Standard RBC models with
flexible prices and wages fail to generate large government spending
multipliers, unless labor supplies are highly elastic (with respect to the
wage rate). The paper shows that this changes when sticky prices and/or
wages are assumed: even when labor supplies are inelastic, the model here
generates sizable government spending multipliers. However, irrespective of
the degree of nominal rigidity, the predicted response of foreign real
activity to a changes in country-specific changes in government purchases
is weak.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The
empirical results regarding the effects of government purchases shocks are
presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the theoretical model and
Section 4 presents simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical evidence on domestic and international effects of changes in
government purchases
In what follows, the following three measures of government purchases of
goods and services are considered: real V. S. military defense spending
(series GDFDEC from Ci tibase) and total real government consumption (as
defined in National Accounts Statistics), in G7 countries (source: OECD
Main Economic Indicators, MEl). Interest centers on the effect of changes
in these variables on economic variables in the V.S. and in an aggregate of
the remaining G7 countries (G6), during the post-Bretton Woods era. G6 time
series are weighted averages of series for the individual G6 countries. 6
All series used below are quarterly; the sample period is 1973:Ql-1997:Q1.
Discussion of the econometric methodology
Much research on the effect of government purchases has focused on military
spending, based on the view that changes in (V. S.) military spending are
6The weights are the shares of these countries in total G6 output, in
1980. For interest rates, a weighted arithmetic average is used; for the
remaining variables, a geometric average is used.
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exogenous with respect to the state of the economy. As pointed out by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1989), given exogeneity of government purchases,
the response of an endogenous variable to an innovation in government
purchases can be computed by regressing government purchases on lagged
government purchases and by regressing the endogenous variable on lagged
values of that variable and on current and lagged values of government
purchases. Based on this idea, I computed impulse responses to shocks to
military purchases by estimating the following equations:
i=2 9In(IDt ) = a O + a 1 0 t + Li=1 aioln(IDt _i ) + ~t;
i=2 i=2 Z
Zt = ~O + ~1ot + Li=1 biOZt _i + Li=O diOIDt _i + ~t'
where ID denotes government purchases and Z is an endogenous variable.
Panel (a) of Table 2 applies this method to compute the effect of a
shock to U.S. military purchases (Panel (d) in Table 2 and Panel (a) in
Table 3 also use this method to compute responses to shocks to U.S. and G6
government consumption). Responses of the following variables are
considered: U.S. and G6 GDP, private consumption (non-durables plus
services), physical investment, price level (CPI), short term nominal
interest rates, the U.S.-G6 bilateral nominal exchange rate and U.S. net
exports (the exchange rate is defined as the U.S. dollar price of a basket
of G6 currencies). (The Appendix provides detailed information on the
data.) The estimating equations use all variables in log form, with the
7
exception of interest rates and net exports.
In addi tion, I computed impulse responses using vector
autoregressions (VARs) of the form
i=2 X
Xt = TO + T1
0 t + Li=1Ai Xt-1 + c t '
where Xt is a vector of variables that includes one of the three measures
of government purchases, as well as the 12 endogenous variables that were
just listed. 8 Wold causal orderings are assumed to generate impulse
responses to government spending shocks. I experiment with two Wold
orderings: one uses government purchases as the first variable, in the
vector Xt (see Panels (b) and (e) in Table 2 and Panel (b) in Table 3),
7 In the regression equations, two lags of the exogenous and
endogenous variables were used (the VARs discussed below also use two
lags), as it appears that two lags are sufficient to obtain regression
residuals that do not exhibit serial correlation. The empirical results are
robust to changes in the number of lags.
8The VAR approach for generating impulse responses is valid even when
government purchases are not exogenous, but that approach is less
efficient, if government purchases are exogenous. The exogeneity assumption
seems harder to defend for general government consumption than for military
purchases.
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while the other uses government purchases as the last variable.
All impulse responses are computed for an innovation to government
purchases that corresponds to 1% of domestic GDP. To save space, responses
are only shown 0, 4, 8 and 12 quarters after the shock, provided that these
response are statistically significant at the 20% level (p-value for
two-sided significance test used).9 (When the response is not significant,
the Table merely reports the sign of the response.). Responses of GDP,
consumption and investment are expressed in multiplier form (e. g., the
response of output, Y, is expressed as hY/hID);10 the responses of the price
level and the exchange rate are expressed as percentage changes, relative
to the "unshocked" paths of these variables, while responses of interest
rates and net exports are expressed as percentage point differences
compared to the "baseline" path (interest rates are expressed in % per
annum) .
Discussion of estimation results
The impact responses of U.S. and G6 output to shocks to U.S. and G6
government spending are generally statistically insignificant. 11 However,
country-specific government purchases shocks have a significant positive
lagged effect on domestic and foreign output. The multiplier of domestic
and foreign output to a country-specific shock to government purchases
mostly range between 1 and 2, eight or twelve quarters after the shock. A
country-specific increase in government purchases likewise induces a
statistically significant lagged rise in domestic and foreign private
consumption (of non-durables and services), but consumption rises less than
output--the consumption multipliers are smaller than unity (interestingly,
the responses of G6 consumption, to a rise in U.S. government purchases,
are more significant than those of U.S. consumption). The responses of U.S.
investment (to U. S. and G6 government spending shocks) are almost all
insignificant, but G6 investment shows a significant positive response to
increases in U.S. and in G6 government purchases.
9Significance based on 80% confidence bands for impulse responses
(confidence bands for impulse responses based on bivariate model are
asymptotic bands, constructed using estimated covariance matrix of
regression coefficients of; confidence bands for VARs are based on Monte
Carlo with 250 replications).
laThe Appendix explains how these multipliers are constructed.
11Note that when the government spending variable is assumed to be
ordered last in the Wold causal chain, then the impact effect of a shock to
government spending on the remaining variables in the VAR is zero, by
construction.
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A positive shock to U.S. government purchases induces a depreciation
of the U.S. dollar (18 of the 22 responses to a U.S. government purchases
shock show a depreciation of the U.S. dollar), although it can be noted
that this response is only statistically significant with a delay of 8 or
12 quarters. The response of the U.S. dollar to a positive G6 government
purchases shock is more mixed: such a shock induces a significant
appreciation of the U.S. dollar, 4 quarters after the shock, but it
triggers a significant depreciation of the U.S. dollar 8 quarters after the
shock.
The U.S. and G6 price levels both respond negatively to a positive
shock to domestic or foreign government purchases. Finally, it can be noted
that the U.S. nominal interest rate responds negatively to a positive shock
to U.S. or G6 government purchases (the G6 nominal interest rate likewise
responds negatively to a rise in U.S. or G6 government purchases, but the
responses of the G6 interest rate are less significant, statistically).
The next section develops a two-country dynamic general equilibrium
models. That model will be examined for its ability to explain the
empirical regularities that have just been discussed.
3. The Model 12
A world with two countries, called home and foreign, is considered. In each
country there are firms, a representative household and a government.
Domestic physical capital and domestic labor are used to produce tradable
and imported intermediate
intermediate goods (labor and
internationally). Each country uses
physical
domestic
capital are immobile
inputs to produce a single non-tradable final good that can be used as a
private or government consumption good, or as a capital good. Each
country's government issues a national currency, and it purchases the
country's final good. Government purchases are exogenous. These purchases
are financed using a lump sum tax. The government consumption good does not
enter the households' utility function or the firms' production functions.
The following description focuses on the home country. The foreign
country is a complete mirror image of the home country (preferences and
technologies are symmetric across the two countries). Foreign country
variables are denoted by an asterisk.
3.1. Household preferences
The preferences of the home country household are described by:
12The model here extends Kollmann (1999), by considering a more
general utility function and adding government purchases to the structure.
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EO denotes
available in
'" tEO Lt=O (3 U(Ct,Att/Pt,L t )· (1a)
the mathematical expectation conditional on information
period t=O. 0<(3<1 is a subjective discount factor and U(.) is
an instantaneous utility function. Ct and Lt represent the household's
consumption of the home country final good and her labor effort,
respectively, in period t. At t denotes the household's stock of home country
money, at the beginning of period t, while Pt is the price of the final
good. The household can provide labor services of different types that are
indexed by he[O,I]. Lt is defined as Lt=J~ It(h) dh, where It(h) denote the
amount of type h labor. The utility function U is given by:
where W>O, ~<1, r<I, K>O and ~~O are parameters.
3.2. Technologies, firms and the structure of goods markets
There are three types of firms in the each country: (i) intermediate good
producers; (ii) final good producers; (iii) capital rental firms. There is
a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by se[O,I] produced in the home
country and a continuum of intermediate goods, also indexed by se[O,ll,
produced in the foreign country. The intermediate goods are imperfect
substitutes for one another. Each intermediate good is produced by a single
firm--monopolistic competition is, hence, assumed in intermediate goods
markets. In contrast, the final good sector and the rental market for
capital are perfectly competitive, in each country. Firms are price takers
in the markets for their inputs.
3.2.1. Final good production
The home country final good is produced using the aggregate technology
Q = (D )1-"(Z )" , with 0<,,<1, (2)
t t t
where Qt is the home final good production level, while Dt and Zt are
indexes of domestically produced and imported intermediate goods:
Dt={J~dt(s)I/(I+V)}I+Vand Zt={J~Zt(s)I/(I+V)}I+V, with V>O,
where dt(s) and Zt(s) denote, respectively, the quantities of domestically
produced and of imported intermediate (type s) goods that are purchased by
home country final good producers. Let pdt (s) and PJ1-
t
(s) denote the
purchase prices paid by home country final good producers for these
intermediate goods. These prices are expressed in home currency (throughout
the paper, all prices are expressed in the buyer's currency).
Cost minimization conditions for final good producers can be written as:
-(1 +v)/vdt(s)= Dt'(pdt(s)/:PVt), (3a)
-(1+v)/vZt(s)=Zt'(PJ1-t (s)/:Pi''t), (3b)
8
and
with
Dt /Z t=(a/(l-a)):PVt l:PZ t , (3c)
1 -l/v -v 1 -l/v -V 13
:PVt"{Jo(pdt(sJl ds} and :PZt"{Jo(M-t(s)) ds}. (3d)
Perfect competition in the market of the final good implies that the
date t home country final good price, Pt , is:
P t = (a) -a (1-a) I-a (:PV
t
)I-a (:PZ
t
)a, (4)
where the term on the right-hand side is the marginal cost of producing the
final good.
3.2.2. Intermediate goods producers
The production function of the firm producing intermediate good's', in the
home country, is:
_ 1/1 1-1/1Yt(s) - 9t (1\(s)) (.'I\(s)) , (5)
at date t, where Yt(s) is the firm's output. 9t is an exogenous
productivity parameter (productivity is identical for all intermediate
goods locates in the same country). :1\ (s) is the physical capital stock
used by the's' firm at date t, while 2 t (s) is an index of the different
. ~ 1/(1+7) (1+7) .types of labor used by the firm: 2t (s)={Jot t (h;s) dh} , with 7>0.
Let Rt and wt(h) be the date t nominal rental rate of capital and the
nominal wage rate for type h labor, respectively, in the home country. The
cost function of a home intermediate good producer is:
(li (y)" Min R·J{ + Jlw (h)t(h) dh s. t. Y = 9 J{1/1 {Jl t (h)1I(1+7 )dh}0+7) (1-1/1)
t J{,tlh)t ot t 0
Cost minimization implies:
-(1+7)/7tt(h;s) = 2 t (s) [wt(h)/Wt ] ,2t (s) = ((1-1/1)11/1) Rt J{t(s)/Wt , (6)
1 -117 -7 14
where Wt"{J
o
wt(h) dh} is an aggregate wage index.
As the production function exhibits constant returns to scale,
(lit (y)=y·(lit' holds, where (lit' is the firm's marginal cost function:
(li '=(119 ) (R )1/1 (W )1-1/1 1/1-1/1 0-1/1)-0-1/1) (7)
t t t t
The home country producer of intermediate good s faces the demand
function (3a) in her domestic market. A condition analogous to (3b) holds
in the foreign country, which implies that the firm's export demand
" "" " - (1+v )Iv "function is: Zt (s)=Zt' (M-t (s)I:PZt ) , where Zt (s) denotes foreign
country purchases of the home produced intermediate good of type s, while
13
:PVt and :PZt are price index that represents the minimal expenditure,
in home currency, needed to purchase one unit of the composite intermediate
inputs Dt and Zt' respectively. (:PVtDt=Jpdt(s)dt(s), :PZtZt=JM-t(s)Zt(s)ds,
when (3a), (3b) hold.)
14Wt represents the minimal expenditure, in home country currency,
needed to purchase one unit of the composite labor input 2 in period t.
9
15is the export price of the good, in terms of foreign currency. The
(8 )
good s
defined as
i •(dt(s)+Zt(s)),
two countries,
currency price of foreign currency.
output equals the demand for its good:
•Yt(s) = dt(s) + Zt(s).
At t, the profit of the home country producer of intermediate
• • •pdt (s) d t (s) + e t PJJt (s) Zt (s) - Qj~' •
is the nominal exchange rate between the
is:
where e t
the home
•PJJt(s)
firm's
(9a)
(9b)
for intermediate goods
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), it is assumed that there are no
costs to trade between the countries, which implies that the price of each
intermediate goods is the same in both markets, i.e .
•PJJt(s) = pdt(s)/et
•which implies TZt = T7\/et .
Equations (9a), (9b) and the demand functions
(3) imply that the nominal profit of the producer of intermediate good s in
the home country can be expressed as the following function of the home
currency price of that good, pdt(s):
(10)
Determination of intermediate goods prices
Prices for intermediate goods, are set in a staggered fashion, a la Calvo
(1983): producers of these goods are not allowed to change the domestic
currency prices of their goods, unless they receive a random llprice-change ll
signal. The probability that the price of an intermediate good of a given
type, in terms of the currency of its producer, can be changed in any
domestic currency prices are changed each period and the
particular period is 1-1)p' a constant (hence, a fraction 1-1) of allp
average time
between price changes is 1/(1-1) )). Consider a producer of an intermediatep
good in the home country that is "allowed" at date t to set a new home
currency price and let pdt t denote this new price. With probability
,
pdt t is still in effect at date t+T. Hence, the firm sets pdt t at
, ,
(1) )TP ,
T=oo 1:'
pdt t= Arg Max ~'=0(1) ) Etpt t ITt (pd )/Pt ' (11), pdL-r p ,+1:' +T +T
where Pt t is the pricing kernel used by the firm at date t to value, +T
random date t+T pay-offs (that are expressed in units of the composite
consumption good). As home country firms are owned by that country's
15· • -l/v -vTZt={J(PJJt (s)) ds}. The foreign country's final good technology
is: Q: = (D:)l-,,(Z:)", with D:={Jd:(s)1/0+V)}1+V, Z:={J«s)1/0+V)}1+V,
•where dt(s) denotes intermediate inputs produced in the foreign country.
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(14)
16This assumption is standard
Mankiw (1997, ch.8)). When prices
representative household (see discussion below) it is assumed that Pt t, +,
equals the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption of
,
that household: Pt,t+,=~ .UC, t+,/UC, t' where UC,t+, is the household's
marginal utility of consumption at date t+,.
The solution of the maximization problem in (11) is:
pdt,t = (l+v) {~:~ (»p)'Et{Bt,t+, mt~,}}~{~:~ (»p)'EtBt,t+,}' (12)
_ * (l+v)/v
where ~t,t+,=Pt,t+,·(l/Pt+,)· (D t +, + Dt+,)·(~Vt+,) .
Note that the analysis here presupposes that firms that set a new
price at date t satisfy the demand for their good, at that price, as long
as the price remains in effect (see (8)).16 In other words, firms with
predetermined prices (prices that were set in previous periods) have an
infinitely elastic output supply schedule.
As, at date t, a fraction (1-» )(» )' of producers of intermediatep p
goods are posting home currency prices that were set ,~o periods ago, (3d)
implies that the law of motion of the price index ~Vt is:
(~'D ) -lIv =» (~V )-l/v + (1-» ) (pd ) -lIv.
t p t-l p t, t
For future reference, note that (6) implies that the total wage bill
of home country intermediate goods producers is
J~ J~ wt(h) tt(h;s) dh ds = ((1-1/J)/1/J) Rt J{t' (13)
while (3), (10) and (13) imply that total profits of home producers of
intermediate goods can be expressed as:
lTt = J~ llt (pdt(s)) ds = ~Vt·(Dt + <) - (1I1/J) RtJ{t'
3.2.3. The supply and demand of physical capital
Physical capital in a given country is a homogeneous factor of production
that is owned by firms that rent capital to that country's producers of
intermediate goods. The law of motion of the home country capital stock is:
Kt +1 + ¢(Kt +1 ,Kt ) = Kt (l-d) + It' (lSa)
where It' gross investment, denotes what quantity of home final output is
in models with price rigidities (e.g.,
are fully flexible (» =0), then (12)p
implies that the price pdt,t is set at the current marginal cost,
multiplied by the mark-up factor l+v>l (pdt,t=(l+v).mt~,)' When »p>o, then
up to a certainty equivalent approximation, pdt t equals a weighted sum of
,
current and expected future marginal production costs, multiplied by l+v,
i.e. then pdt t depends on future marginal costs as well. As long as pdt t
, ,
exceeds the firm's marginal (=average) cost, it is not in its interest to
ration its customers.
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required to change the capital stock from Kt to Kt +l . O<d<1 is the
depreciation rate of the capital stock and 4>(.,.) is a convex adjustment
cost function that is homogeneous of degree one in K and Kt :2 t+l
4>(Kt +l ,Kt ) = 0.5 ~ {Kt +l - Kt } IKt , ~>O. (ISb)
Home country capital rental firms maximize
),T=OO E p (R K - P I )/P
~=O t t,t+T t+T t+T t+T t+T t+T'
where Rt Kt - Pt It is the nominal cash flow of these firms, in+1:' +1:' +T +1:'
period t+T. Optimal investment decisions by capital rental firms can be
characterized by the following Euler equation:
1 = {3 Et {Pt,t+l • [Rt +l /Pt +l + I-d + 4>2,t+l]1[1 + 4>I,t]}' (16)
where 4>I,t=a4> (Kt+l,Kt)laKt+l and 4>2,t+l=a4> (Kt+2,Kt+l)laKt+l'
Total demand for physical capital, by home country intermediate good
firms is:
J<t=fJ<t(s)ds= (Dt+Z:) (:P:l\I:P:l\)-(1+v)IV (1/e
t
)((l/J/(1-l/J))(W
t
/R
t
)I-l/J, (17)
- -(1+v)lv -vl(1+v) . .
where :P:l\={f(pdt (s)) ds} 1S a prlce index that evolves
according to: (:PVt)-(I+V)IV=Up(:PVt_l)-(I+V)IV+(I-Up) (pdt,t)-(I+V)IV. (18)
3.3. Asset markets, household consumption and investment decisions
Each country's representative household owns that country's firms. It can
also hold the following assets: local money; risk-free nominal one-period
bonds denominated in local and in foreign currency.17 The period t budget
constraint of the home country household is, hence:
(19)
are,
currency
*r t
and Bt
home
bonds and of foreign currency bonds that become due in period t. r
t
and
are the nominal interest rates on these two types of bonds. TIt+RtKt-PtIt is
the total cash flow generated by all home country firms. The last term on
the right-hand side of (19) is the household's wage income.
Mt +l + At +l + e t Bt +l + Pt Ct + ~t = Mt + At (l+r t ) +
* 1e t Bt (l+r t )+ (TIt + Rt Kt - Pt It) + fo1t(h) wt(h) dh,
Here, ~tis a lump sum tax paid by the household. At
respectively, the home country household's (net) stocks of
The home country household seeks to maximize her expected life-time
utility (1a) subject to the restriction that the budget constraint (19)
17The household's financial transactions are, thus, restricted to
trade in bonds. This asset market structure is consistent with the well
documented home-country bias in investors' equity portfolios (e.g., French
and Poterba (1991)). Kollmann (1995, 1996, 1998a) compares models of the
international economy in which bonds only are traded internationally (as
assumed in the present paper) to models that also allow for international
trade in state-contingent assets--it is found that, empirically, the former
models capture key international business cycle stylized facts better.
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holds for all dates and all states of the world and subject to the demand
functions for the household's labor (see (23), below). Ruling out Ponzi
games, the following equations are first-order conditions of this decision
problem:
1 = 13 (1+r t +1 ) Et{{UC,t+/UC,t}o{Pt/Pt+1}}' (20)
*1 = 13 (1+r t +1) Et{{UC,t+1/Uc,t}o{Pt/Pt+1}o{et+1/et}}' j*i, (21)
1-0' f-1
K (flO' )Et {Uc, t+1 0 (Ct +1) (.Mt+/Pt+1) IP t+1}= r t+1 Et {UC, t+1 /P t+1}' (22)
Equations (20) and (21) are Euler conditions, while equation (22) can
be interpreted as a money demand equation.
3.4. Wage determination
(6) implies that, at date t, total demand for type h labor in the home
country is:
\ (w
t
(h) )=f~tt (h, s )ds=( (1-1/1)/1/1) 0 (w
t
(h)) - (1 +r )/r oR
t
0 J{t 0 (W
t
)-1/r , (23)
1
where J{t=foJ{t (s )ds.
The household acts as a wage setter, subject to the rule that the
nominal wage rate for labor of a given type h can only be changed when a
random llwage-change signal" is received. With an
the wage rate of a given labor type h can be
exogenous probability 1-n
w
changed in any particular
is still in
first-order
lifetime utility subject
T(nw) , Wt,t(h)
to satisfy the followinghasThus,t+T.effect at
wt t(h) that maximizes her expected,
(23) and the restriction that, with probability
period. Assume that the wage for type h labor is changed at date t, in the
home country, and let wt t(h) be the new wage. The household agrees to meet,
the demand for type h labor at that wage until the next wage-change signal
(for type h labor) is received. The home country household sets the wage
to (19) and
condition:
~:~(l3nw)TEt{Uc,t+Toa[Wt,t(h)ott+T(Wt,t(h))/Pt+T]lawt,t(h)}+
~:~(l3nw)T Et{UL,t+Toatt+T(Wt,t(h))laWt,t(h)} = 0 (24a)
marginal disutili ty of
a fraction (1-V )(n)T
w w
(24b)
labor and
of labor
18(23b) implies that the same contract wage is set for all labor types
for which a wage change occurs at t. The left hand side of (24a) shows the
effect on the household's expected life-time utility of the change in the
13
(25)
types, the wage rate in effect at date t was set in period t-,. Hence, the
-lIr -rlaw of motion of the home aggregate wage index Wt={J
o
wt(h) dh} is:
(W )-lIr = D (W )-l/r + (I-D) ( )-lIr 19
t w t-l w wt t .,
3.5. Government
The government purchases ~t units of the final good, and it finances these
purchases by issuing the local money and by levying a lump sum tax on the
household:
Pt'~t = Mt +1-Mt + :r t , (26)
where Mt is the home country money supply, at the beginning of period t,
while :rt is the lump sum tax. Government purchases and the money supply are
exogenous (the government makes no attempt to influence the exchange rate,
i.e. the exchange rate floats freely).
3.6. Market clearing conditions
Demand equals supply in labor markets and in the markets for intermediate
goods as the household always satisfies the demand for its labor services
that she faces and as the producers of intermediate goods likewise meet the
demand for their goods that they face.
Market clearing for the final good in the home country requires:
Ct + It = Qt' (27)
Each country's currency is only held by its residents. Equilibrium in
the home country money market requires, thus:
flexible (D =0), and the own-wage
w
elasticity of labor demand is infinitely elastic, r=O (see (23)), then
(24b), (25) imply Wt/Pt=-UL t/UC t' which corresponds to the familiar, ,
first-order condition, in models with competitive labor markets, that
prescribes the equalization of the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure to the real wage rate.
stream of labor income and of the change in current and future labor effort
that results from an infinitesimal change in wt t(h). Here, it is assumed,
that, when setting wt t(h), the representative household takes the current,
and future average wage (W) and other economywide variables as given. A
note available from the author considers a structure with a continuum of
households, where each household monopolistically provides a single type of
labor. In that structure, an individual household's wage setting decisions
have no effect on economywide variables. (23b) holds in that structure and
the dynamics of aggregate variables is likewise unchanged (compared to the
model in the text), provided there is full risk-pooling among domestic
households, e.g., if complete financial markets exits within each country
(the latter implies that consumption and money holdings are equated across
all residents of the same country).
19N.B. When the wage rate is fully
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(29)
currencies of the two countries requires,
* 20and Bt + Bt = O.
country's market for capital requires:
*At + At = 0
the homeMarket clearing in
thus:
Mt +1 = Mt +1, (28)
where Mt +1 is the country's money supply, while Mt +1 represents the desired
money balances of the country's household.
Governments do not issue bonds. Market clearing in the world market
for bonds denominated in the
Kt = Kt , (30)
where the left hand side is the total demand for physical capital in
the country (as given by equation (17)), while the right hand side is the
total supply of capital in that country.
3.7. Solution method
Given exogenous processes for productivity, real government purchases and
.. '* .. t=oo
the money supply in the two countries {et ,Mt ,i01't,e t ,Mt ,i01't}t=O' and given
initial conditions for the predetermined variables KO,AO,BO,W_l,~V_l,~Z_I'
- .... .. .. _*
~V_l,KO,W_l' ~V_l,~Z_I,~V_l' the preceding equations for the home country,
as well as corresponding conditions for the foreign country, determine the
'* .. .. ..
aggregate variables {Qt,Ct,Dt,Zt,Pt,Wt,Rt,Kt+l,It,rt,rst,et'~t,Qt,Ct,Dt,Zt'
'* .. .... '*.. .. '* t=ooPt,Wt,Rt,Kt+l,It,rt,rst'~t}t=O·
An approximate model solution can be obtained by taking a linear
approximation of these equations around a deterministic steady state, i.e.
around an equilibrium in which all exogenous and endogenous variables are
constant. This approximation yields a system of linear expectational
difference equations that was solved using Blanchard and Kahn's (1980)
formulae. In the simulations below, the model is linearized around a
deterministic steady state that is symmetric across countries (i.e. in
which all variables have the same values in both countries), and in which
each country's net stock of foreign currency bonds is zero.
3.8. Parameter values
3.8.1. Preference, technology and price and wage adjustment parameters
The coefficient of relative risk aversion and the subjective discount
factor are set at ~=1 and at ~=1/1.01, respectively.21 These values are in
the range of available available estimates of ~ and ~, for the G7 countries
20 * *At' Bt are the foreign household's stock of bonds denominated in the
home country's currency and in foreign currency, respectively.
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(e.g., Braun et al. (1993) and Barrionuevo (1991)). /3=1/1.01 implies that
the steady state real interest rate is 1%, a value that corresponds roughly
to the long run average return on capital observed empirically (in steady
state, /3"(1+r)=l holds, where r is the steady state interest rate). The
preference parameter 11 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Many
studies that use micro-level data find labor supply elasticities close to
zero (see Pencavel (1986), Mroz (1987) Card (1991)). In contrast, RBC
models have often assumed labor supply elasticities in the range of 2
(e.g., King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)), or even larger elasticities--see,
Hansen (1985) who assumes that labor supply is infintitely elastic. In the
simulations, I consider a baseline case in which 11=2 (a sensitivity
analysis with respect to 11 is conducted).
The preference parameter K (see (lb)) is set in such a way that the
steady state consumption velocity (ratio of nominal consumption expenditure
to the money stock) equals unity. 22 As mentioned above, equation (22) can be
interpreted as a money demand equation. Up to a certainty equivalent
approximation, (22) implies:
-e e
r c
Mt +l /P t+l=(r t+l"lJ'/(rK)) "(ct +l ) +vt +l , (31)
where vt +l is a forecast error (Et vt +l =O) and e r =-l/(r-l) and
e = (lJ'-1) 1 (r-1) are the elasticities of money demand with respect to the
c
nominal interest rate and to consumption, respectively. The baseline
simulations assume € =0.05, 8 =1, consistent with money demand regressions
r c
reported in Mankiw and Summers (1988).
The technology parameter a (see (2)) pins down the ratio of the value
of imports to the value of final good output. The simulations assume a=O.l,
as for the US, the ratio of imports to GDP has been approximately 10%
during the post-Bretton Woods era. 23
22The key model predictions discussed below are not sensitive to the
assumed steady state velocity (a unit velocity is roughly consistent with
data on the Ml consumption velocity in the G7 countries, during the
post-Bretton Woods era; e.g., in the U.S. that velocity was 0.93 in 1994).
23 In the model, a country's GDP equals its final good production plus
its net exports. Denoting home nominal GDP by Y, we have:
*Yt=PtQt+1':l\Zt-1',\Zt' PtQt' the value of the final good sector's output
equals its total cost: Pt Qt =1':l\D t +1'ltZt (as the final good sector is
*competitive). Thus, Yt =1'Vt (Dt +Zt ): a country's GDP equals the value of its
intermediate goods output. Imported inputs account for a fraction a of the
final good sector's cost: 1'ltZt=aPtQt' As described above, the model is
linearized around a symmetric deterministic steady state; net exports are
zero in that steady state; hence, the ratio of imports to GDP equals a, at
16
The own-price elasticity of the demand for intermediate goods (see
(3)) is set at (1+v)/v=6, which implies that the steady state mark up of
price over marginal cost (v) is 0.20, a value close to the estimates of
mark ups (in U.S. manufacturing) reported in .Basu and Fernald (1993).24 In
the U.S. and in the remaining G7 countries, the share of total value added
going to labor is roughly 0.66. In the mode l, the steady state share of
wage payments to GDP is (1-I/J)/ (1 +v l. where I/J is the elasticity of the
production function of intermediate goods with respect to capital (see
(5)). Hence, I/J is set at I/J=0.208.
The capital adjustment cost parameter ~ (see (15b)) is set at ~=6.
Stochastic simulations of the model (with money supply, productivity and
government purchases shocks) show that that value of ~ enables the model to
match the observed variability of investment (for lower values of ~,
investment is excessively volatile).
The simulations consider a baseline case in which the average time
between price changes (in home currency) at the firm level is 4 periods,
where 1 period represents one quarter in calendar time (as the model is
calibrated to quarterly data). This is motivated by recent empirical
studies that suggest average time intervals between price adjustments in
the range of 1 year, for a wide range of products (Romer (1996, p.294)).
Thus, the parameter Dp is set at Dp=0.75, i.e. a fraction 0.25 (=l-Dp ) of
all prices are changed each period. The average interval between wage
changes is likewise assumed to be four
contracts typically have a length of
Taylor (1993, p.77)).
quarters, i.e. D =0.75 is used (wage
w
1 year, in the G7 countries; e.g.,
3.8.2. Exogenous variables
The discussions below focus on the effect of shocks to government
purchases. Hence, productivity and the money supply will be assumed
that steady state.
24The cyclical properties of aggregate price/quantity variables are
invariant to the own-wage elasticity of labor demand, (1+r)/r (see (23)),
and hence no specific value needs to be assigned to the parameter r (the
linearized version of the model does not depend on r).
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constant in the baseline simulations considered below. The model is
linearized around a deterministic steady state in which the share of
government purchases in output is 0.15, which corresponds to the average
values of the government consumption-to-GDP ratios in the U.S. and in the
G6, during the sample period.
Table 1 reports estimation results for bivariate vector
autoregressions (VAR) of order 1 that were fitted to logged U.S. military
purchases and logged G6 government consumption, as well as to U.S. and G6
government consumption, for the period 1973:QI-97:Ql. Government purchases
follow a very persistent process: estimates of the diagonal elements of the
matrix of autoregressive coefficients of the VAR are close to unity. In
contrast, the off-diagonal elements are mostly close to zero. The data are
consistent with the hypothesis that an innovation to government consumption
in one country has little effect on government consumption in the other
country, in subsequent periods. 25
Based on these findings, the simulations assume that government
purchases in the two countries are random walks:
(32)
•
where /:;t and /:;t are white noises.
4. Model predictions
Theoretical impulse responses are reported in Tables 4 and 5 (responses
T=O, T=4 and T=OO periods after the shock are shown). The measures of home
and foreign output used in these Tables are
• •• 26Yt=Dt+Zt , Yt=Dt+Zt ·
The theoretical consumption variable is Ct , the price level is Pt' The
*' * *' *measure of home country net exports is NXt =:PZtZt -:PZtZt)1 (:PZtZt +:PZtZt ) ,
which corresponds to the definition used in the empirical analysis (see
Table 2).
25 In contrast, Table 1 suggests that a positive innovation to G6
government consumption triggers a significant lagged increase in U.S.
military purchases.
26 •Yt'Yt are measures of home and foreign real GDP, respectively. As
•
noted in Section 3.8.1., home nominal GDP is Yt=:PVt'(Dt+Zt ). Real GDP, can
be computed by dividing Yt by the growth factor of the price index :PVt ,
•
compared to some fixed base. period, t=b: Ytl (:PVt/:PV
b
) =:PVb'(Dt+Zt)'
Normalizing :PVb=1 yields Yt=Dt+Zt .
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To facilitate the comparison with the empirical responses shown in
Tables 2 and 3, the theoretical responses are computed for innovations that
increase government consumption in a given country by 1% of its pre-shock
output. Also, the theoretical responses of output, consumption and
investment are reported in multiplier form, the responses of the price
level and the exchange rate are percentage deviations from the "unshocked"
baseline.
A simultaneous increase in government purchases in both countries
It is convenient to begin the discussion of model predictions by
considering the case where both countries are affected by a simultaneous
and identical positive shock to their government purchases. Result for that
case are shown in Table 4, where responses of (home) output, consumption,
investment and the home price level are reported for three values of the
labor supply elasticity (~): ~=.1, 2, 00. In Table 4, versions of the model
wi th flexible prices and wages, with sticky prices (but flexible wages),
with sticky wages (but flexible prices), and with sticky prices and wages
are compared.
An increase in government purchases reduces household wealth, which
induces the household to increase her labor supply, and to consume less
(consumption and leisure (time not spent working) being normal goods, for
the utilty function assumed here). This explains why output rises, when a
27
rise in government purchases occurs. The rise in hours worked increases
the marginal product of capital, which induces a rise in the capital
stock--investment rises, thus.
nominal consumption expenditures
Interestingly, (home and foreign) nominal interest rates, and
* *(poC, p oC ) are not affected by changes
in government purchases, when the consumption elasticity of money demand
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are set
case in the simulations reported in Table 4).28
at C =w=l (as is
c
Hence, the fall
the
in
27See Baxter and King (1993) for discussion of this mechanism.
28Substituting consumption from the linearized version of the money
demand equation (31) into the household's (linearized) Euler equation (20)
yields a difference equation of the following form, when C =w=l (assuming a
c
constant nominal money supply): Et (r,+l-r )=UoEt (r,-r), for ,~t, where U>l
is a constant (r is the steady state interest rate). A (non-explosive)
model solution requires, hence, that the nominal interest rate is constant
(rt=r). Using (20) and (31), it is straightforward to see that this implies
that PtC
t
is likewise constant (provided c
c
=W=l).
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consumption triggered by a rise in government purchases induces a rise in
the price level.
The lower the labor supply elasticity, the smaller Is the Increase in
hours, and the bigger is the reduction in consumption. In fact, when prices
and wages are flexible, the government purchases multiplIer of output is,
hence, very small (0, 09), when the labor supply elasticity is low; it
exceeds unity (1.08), when labor supply is infinitely elastic. This
confirms the well-known fact that a flexible price-flexible wage business
cycle model cannot generate a significant response of output to government
purchases shocks, unless highly elastic labor supplies are assumed (Baxter
and King (1993)).
Assuming sticky prices and wages raises significantly the impact
multiplier. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that, when prices are
sticky, then the price level rises less strongly, in the period of the
increase in government purchases--hence, pr ivate consumption fall sIess
strongly (recall that the nominal value of consumption, poQ, is constant).
However, the rate of increase of the price level is bigger, in the periods
that follow the shock, compared to the flexible prices case--hence, the
real interest rate falls, in the periods that follow the shock (recall that
the nominal interest rate does not respond to the rise in government
purchases); this explains why investment rises more strongly, in the period
of the shock. Hence, output rises more strongly too, in that period. The
impact multiplier is, hence, bigger when prices are sticky. The same logic
explains why the impact multiplier increases when wages are sticky (while
prices are flexible), as the stickiness of wages implies that prices rise
less, in the period of the shock. When prices and wages are sticky, the
impact multiplier is significantly bigger than when prices and wages are
flexible. The increase in the multiplier is particularly sizable when the
labor supply elasticity is small: for n=O.l, the multiplier increases from
0.09, when prices and wages are flexible, to 1.33, when prices and wages
are sticky; when n=to, by contrast, the multiplier increases from 1. 08 to
1.39. Hence, it appears that the impact multiplier is, roughly, independent
of the labor supply elasticity, when prices and wages are sticky, It is
important to note that this remark only applies to the impact multiplier:
when the labor supply elasticity is low, the increase in output is quite
short-lived, whereas the long-run response of output is sizable, when high
labor supply elasticities are assumed.
Permanent rise in home government purchases (foreign government purchases
held constant), Table 5
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In Table 5, the effect of a permanent rise in home government purchases (by
1% of pre-shock home output) is considered, while foreign government
purchases do not change. Panel (a) of the Table reports results for the
structure with flexible prices and wages while Panel (b) presents results
for the baseline structure with sticky prices and wages (the labor supply
elasticity is set at 1)=2, in Table 5). A country specific rise in home
government purchases induces home country responses of output, consumption
and investment that are roughly similar to those that obtain when
government purchases rise by the same amount in both countries. In contrast
to a worldwide rise in government purchases, a country-specific positive
shock to home government purchases induces a fall in home net exports, in
the initial periods that follow the shock. Also, the substantial rise in
home output induces a fall in the relative price of home produced
intermediate goods (compared to the price of foreign intermediate goods),
and the home country experiences a sizable depreciation of it nominal (and
real) and real exchange rate (the nominal exchange rate depreciates by
1.2%, in response to a rise in government purchases by 1% of pre-shock home
GDPl.
Foreign output is affected through two channels: (i) The fall in the
relative price of home goods induces agents to substitute foreign goods
with home good. (iiJ The rise in home investment and government purchases
exceeds the fall in home consumption, 1. e. home absorption rises, which
stimulates home demand for foreign goods. These two effects roughly off-set
each other and, hence, the effect of a rise in home government purchases on
foreign output is close to zero; this is so, irrespective of whether fixed
or flexible prices/wages are assumed.
A version of the model with Pricing to Market
The baseline model assumes that producers of intermediate goods charge the
same price (when expressed in a common currency) in their domestic market
and in their export market (see (9a)); this implies that export prices, in
terms of foreign currency, are highly responsive to exchange rate movements
(ceteris paribus, an exporter responds to a 1% fall in the external value
of its home currency by reducing its export price, in foreign currency, by
1%). Recent empirical research on export pricing suggests that, overall,
the behavior of U.S. firms is consistent with this prediction, while
non-U.S. firms appear to be less likely to pass exchange rate movements
through to their foreign customers (e.g., Knetter (1993)).
Therefore, a version of the model is explored that departs from the
baseline structure by assuming "pricing to market" (PTM) behavior, in the
21
sense that intermediate goods producers (located in both countries) can set
different prices in domestic and export markets. In both markets, staggered
price setting a la Calvo (1983), in terms of the local currency, is
assumed; the average duration between price adjustments is assumed to be 4
periods, in both markets. Results for the PTM case are shown in Panel (cl
of Table 5.
PTM behavior strengthens slightly the response of foreign output to a
rise in home government purchases (the impact multiplier of foreign output
is 0.10, when PTM is assumed, compared to O. 04 in the baseline nominal
rigidities structure), as PTM dampens the fall in the relative price of
home goods, in the short run.
Discussion of shortcomings of the baseline model
Key shortcomings of the baseline model are: (i) it predicts that
consumption falls and that the price level rises, in response of a rise in
government purchases; (iil the model generates cross-country transmission
effects of government purchases that seem weak, compared to the estimated
transmission effects.
A variant of the model with productive government consumption
Shortcoming (i) can be overcome by assuming that government purchase shocks
have a positive effect on private sector productivity, as this generates a
positive wealth effect that counteracts the negative wealth effect due to
increase in taxes. This is motivated by the plausible idea that, in the
real world, governments do have a positive effect on private sector
productivity (e. g, by maintaining law and order and by providing other
vital goods 1.
Panel (d) in Table 3 considers a variant of the model in which a 1%
increase in home government purchases induces a 0.15% increase in home
country total factor productivity: it is assumed there that the
productivity index at is linked to government purchases, as follows:
a =EJo1l0 . 15
29 t t '
where 8 is a constant. In that variant of the model, a positive shock to
home government purchases induces an increase in home consumption, and a
fall in the home price level.
29Experiments with a range of values of the elasticity of productivity
with respect to government purchases show that when that elasticity is set
at a value smaller than 0.15, then a rise in home country government
purchases induces a fall in home consumption, as in the baseline structure.
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Sensitivity to assumed time-series process of government purchases
Predictions regarding the international transmission of shocks to
government purchases are highly sensitive to the assumed time-series
process of government purchases. The simulations discussed so far assume
that a shock to government purchases in a given country has no effect on
government purchases in the other country. In Panel (g) of Table 3, the law
of motion of government purchases (32) is replaced by:
(33)
(33) implies that (logged) government purchases have a unit root, but that
the (log) difference between home and foreign government purchases is
stationary (the first-order autocorrelation of that log difference is
0.98), i.e. that government purchases are cointegrated across countries.
When (33) is assumed, a positive innovation to home government
purchases induces a lagged rise in foreign government purchases. That
innovation has, hence, a negative wealth effect, for the foreign household,
which induces that household to raise her labor supply; a positive
innovation to home government purchases triggers, thus, a much stronger
positive response of foreign output, than in the baseline version of the
model. Assuming (33) allows, hence, to make progress in overcoming
shortcoming (ii) discussed above.
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APPENDIX
I. Description of data
In what follows, "MEl" refers to the OECD publication (CD-ROM) Main
Economic Indicators, Historical Statistics 1960-1996; "IFS" refers to the
IMF publication International Financial Statistics (various issues).
Output--GDP in volume terms (MEl).
Investment--gross fixed capital formation plus change in stock of
inventories, in volume terms (MEl).
Consumption--private non-durables plus services consumption expenditures, in
volume terms, from OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
(OECD QNA does not provide non-durables plus services consumption for
Germany. Hence, The G6 consumption index does not include German
consumption. For Germany, the MEl series for output and investment start in
1991:Ql; these series were spliced to IFS data for earlier periods; the IFS
output series used for that purpose is real GDP; the IFS investment series
used for Germany is nominal investment deflated using CPl.)
Money supply--narrow money stock, Ml (MEl). The UK money series starts in
1982:Q3. (G6 money series for 1982:Q3-1994:Q3 is geometric weighted average
of Ml in each G6 country; 1982:Q3-1994:Q3 series was spliced to geometric
weighted average of Ml in non-UK G6 countries during prior period).
Price level--consumer price index, CPI (IFS).
Nominal interest rate--short term interest rates from Citibase. U. S.: CD
rate (series FYUSCD); Japan, Germany, France: call money rate (FYJPCM,
FYGECM, FYFRCM); U.K.: interest rate on prime bank bills (FYGBBB); Italy:
bond yields, credit institutions (FYITBY); Canada: prime corporate paper,
60 days (FYCACP).
Nominal exchange rate between U.S. and G6--a geometric average of bilateral
U.S. dollar exchange rates (IFS).
All time series are used in quarterly form. Interest rates are
expressed on a per annum basis. Price level, interest rate and exchange
rate time series were obtained at a monthly frequency from data sources.
Quarterly averages of these series are used. Output, consumption,
investment, price level and money series are seasonally adjusted (the
remaining series do not exhibit seasonality). The G6 aggregate series for
the interest rate and stock returns are arithmetic averages of series for
the individual G6 countries; G6 aggregates for other variables are
geometric averages of individual G6 series. Country weights: Japan, .28;
Germany, .20; France, .18; United Kingdom, .14; Britain, .12; Canada, .07.
These weights are 1980 shares of individual G6 countries's GDP (in U.S.
dollars, at 1980 U.S. exchange rates) in total G6 GDP.
purchases
the sample
(the numbers
unshocked paths.
yUs is used for
In Table 1,
GUs, b/yUS, b
t t
us b us b
the growth factor Yt+~ IY t ' ).
output with respect to U.S. government
reported in Table 1 ignore
The multiplier of G6
is computed using:
II.
Computation of government purchases multipliers
Estimating the models described in Section 2 using series on log government
purchases and logged output, log consumption and log investment allows to
us us .
compute a response ~ln(Yt+T)/~ln(Gt)' where ~ denotes the dlfference
compared to the "unshocked" path. A multiplier (~Y~~T/~G~s) can be computed
. us us us us us. b us bby notlng that ~ln(Yt+T)/~ln(Gt );(~Yt+T/~Gt )'(Gt IYt+~) and, hence:
~Yus I~Gus; [~ln(Yus )/~ln(Gus)] I [(Gus,b/yUS,b).(yUS,b/yUS,b)]
t+T t t+T t t t t+T t '
where yUs ,b and GUs, b denote the
average of the ratio of GUs to
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nY~:,/nG~s= [nln(y~:,)/nln(G~s)]/[(G~S,b/y~S,b).(y~S,b/y~6,b).(y~:~b/y~6,b)].
In Table 1, the sample average of yUS/yG6 is used as an estimate of
yUS,b/yG6,b (the sample average is computed using U.S. and G6 output,
t t
expressed in constant 1980 prices, G6 output being expressed in U.S.
dollars, at the 1980 exchange rate). The remaining multipliers are computed
analogously.
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Table 1. VAR models fitted to U.S. and G6 government purchases
(a) U.S. and G6 government consumption
[ In((!)~S)] [0,96**= (0.01)G6In((!)t ) 0.02
(0.02 )
"0.06
(0.02)
""0.97
(0.02)
us 2Var e t = 0.007 ,
G6 2Var e t = 0.007 ,
US G6Corr(e
t
,et )=-0.00
(b) U.S. military purchases and G6 government consumption
[
0. 96"*
= (0.02)
0.01§
(0.02 )
**0.29
(0.07)
**0.95
(0.01 )
V ,US,mil 0 0172ar ~t =. ,
Note: Estimates of autoregressive coefficients of a first order VAR fitted
to quarterly U.S. and G6 government purchases series are reported, as well
as the variances of the regression residuals and the correlation between
the U.S. and G6 regression residuals.
Panel (a) shows results for VAR in U.S. military purchases and G6
government consumption; Panel (b) shows results for a VAR in U.S. and G6
government consumption. Also included in the regressions were a constant
and a linear time trend (not reported in Table).
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
** *, t, §: coefficient significant at 1%, at 5%, at 10%, or at the 20%
level, respectively (significance levels for two-sided tests).
Sample period: 1973:Q1-97:Q1.
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Table 2. Estimated responses to increase in U.S. purchases
yUS CUS IUS NXuS pUs us us yG6 CG6 IG6 pG6 G6r e r
(a) Shock to US military spending (military spending assumed exogenous)
T=O 1. 10 + -2.66 -0.83 + + 0.22 -1. 24 1. 16 -1.00
T=4 + + -3.16 + + + 0.40 + +
T=8 1. 13 + + 1. 91 0.63 + + 1.33
T=12 + + + + 2.45 0.81 + + +
(b) Shock to US military spending (VAR, military spending ordered first)
T=O + + + + + -0.81 + -0.50
T=4 + + -2.16 + + + +
T=8 + + -2.16 -0.50 + + + + -1. 50
T=12 + + + 1.59 0.46 1.37 -2.00
(c) Shock to US military spending (VAR, military spending ordered last)
T=O u u u u u u u u u u u u
T=4 + -0.87 -1. 66 -2.33 -3.50 + + + -0.07
T=8 + 0.45 0.05 -2.16 -4.33 -3.66 + + + + -0.15
T=12 2.08 0.69 0.38 -1. 00 -4.66 -2.66 11. 16 1. 97 0.50 1. 73 -0.22
(d) Shock to US government consumption (G assumed exogenous)
T=O -0.99 -1. 49 + + + -0.85 +
T=4 -2.17 3.35 + + 0.40 1. 04
T=8 + -1.80 5.11 14.13 2.61 0.63 2.51 +
T=12 + -1.56 6.30 18.43 3.28 0.79 3.01 + +
(e) Shock to US government consumption (VAR, G ordered first)
T=O + -1. 24 -1.60 -0.85 + -1.46 + -0.73
T=4 + 0.53 -3.86 -4.33 + 1. 98 0.54 1. 72 -2.00 -1. 53
T=8 2.48 0.80 + -4.33 -2.73 10.80 3.09 0.72 2.56 -2.73
T=12 1. 92 0.56 2.06 -3.13 18.80 2.99 0.80 2.35 -2.93
(f) Shock to US government consumption (VAR, G ordered last)
T=O u u u u u u u u u u u u
T=4 + -3.20 -4.06 + 1. 77 0.33 1. 66 -0.26
T=8 1.58 0.48 + -4.20 -3.06 9.06 1.91 0.40 1. 63 -0.39
T=12 1. 61 + + + -3.60 15.86 2.06 0.52 1. 71 -0.47
Note: Table presents estimated responses, to U.S. government purchases shocks,
of U.S. and G6 output (y), consumption (C), investment (I), price level (P),
short term interest rate (r), in U. S. net exports (NXUS ), and the nominal
bilateral U.S.-G6 exchange rate (eus ). The shocks (innovations) correspond to
a rise in government purchases by 1% of (pre-shock) U.S. GDP. Responses are
shown T=O, 4, 8 and 12 quarters after the shocks, provided that these
responses are statistically significant at the 20% level (two-sided test).
When the response is not significant, merely the sign of the response is
reported.
Panel (a): responses for shocks to U.S. military purchases, estimated
using bivariate systems, assuming exogeneity of military purchases. Panels
(b), (c): responses to U.S. military purchases estimated using a VAR. Panels
(d)-(f): counterparts to (a)-(c), for shock to U.S. government consumption.
Responses of GDP, consumption and investment are expressed in multiplier
form. Responses of the price level and the exchange rate are percentage
changes, relative to the "unshocked" paths of these variables, while responses
of interest rates and net exports are expressed as percentage point
differences compared to "baseline" paths (interest rates are expressed in %
per annum; net exports defined as (ex-Un)/(ex+Un) , where ex and Un are
U.S. exports and imports of goods and services, in current U.S. dollars).
Table 3. Estimated responses to increase in G6 government consumption
30
yUS CUS rUs NXuS pUS us US yG6 CG6 r G6 pG6 G6r e r
(a) G6 government consumption assumed exogenous
T=O + + 0.74 + -0.86
T=4 + 0.81 -1. 38 + + 1. 48 0.56 + + +
T=8 2.16 1. 03 + -3.57 + + + 2.93 0.85 + + +
T=12 2.70 1. 12 + -4.62 + + 3.72 1.02 1. 90 9.47 1.77
(b) VAR, G6 government consumption ordered first
T=O + + + -0.66
T=4 + 0.26 -2.92 -3.58 -7.07 1. 30 + 1.15 -1.12
T=8 1.33 0.39 + -2.50 -3.69 -3.12 + 1. 23 + 0.93 -1. 73
T=12 1. 42 0.45 + + -3.63 -2.00 13.58 1. 39 0.36 1. 31 -2.81 -1.12
(c) VAR, G6 government consumption ordered last
T=O u u u u u u u u u u u u
T=4 0.75 0.27 + -1.58 -2.04 -6.96 1. 04 0.19 0.83
T=8 0.98 0.31 + -2.10 -2.04 -1.94 + 0.96 0.19 +
T=12 0.98 0.33 + + -2.04 -1.27 9.58 1. 05 0.29 0.75 -1. 38
Note: Table presents estimated responses, to shock to G6 government
consumption (size of shock: 1% of pre-shock G6 GDP). Responses are shown T=O,
4, 8 and 12 quarters after the shock, provided that these responses are
statistically significant at the 20% level (two-sided test). When the response
is not significant, the Table merely reports the sign of the response.
Panel (a): responses estimated using bivariate systems, assuming
exogeneity of government consumption. Panels (b), (c): responses estimated
using a VAR.
See Table 2, for further informations.
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Table 4. Model predictions: increase in government purchases in both countries
Labor supply elasticity, 1)=2 1)=.1 1}=CO
J) -0 J) -.75 J) -0 J) -.75 J) -0 J) -.75 J) -0 J) -.75
p p p p p p p p
J) =0 J) =0 J) =.75 J) =.75 J) =0 J) =.75 J) =0 J) =.75
w w w w w w w w
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Impact responses
Y 0.71 1.36 1. 04 1.45 0.09 1. 33 1. 08 1.39
C -0.46 -0.15 -0.29 -0.10 -0.92 -0.35 -0.20 -0.05
I 0.18 0.52 0.34 0.55 0.02 0.69 0.28 0.45
P 0.64 0.21 0.41 0.14 1. 27 0.48 0.28 0.07
(b) Responses 4 periods after shock
Y 0.73 0.83 0.81 0.93 0.10 0.11 1. 09 1. 16
C -0.43 -0.36 -0.38 -0.31 -0.92 -0.88 -0.16 -0.12
I 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.02 -0.00 0.26 0.28
P 0.60 0.49 0.52 0.42 1. 26 1.21 0.23 0.16
(c) Long run responses
Y 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.12 0.12 1. 14 1. 14
C -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.89 -0.89 0.00 0.00
I 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.14
P 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 1.22 1. 22 0.00 0.00
Note: Model predictions are shown for an unexpected, simultaneous, identical,
permanent rise in government purchases, in both countries (size of shock: 1%
of pre-shock national GDP). Rows labelled Y, C, I and P show responses of
output (GDP) , private consumption, physical investment and the price level,
respectively. Responses of output, consumption and investment are reported in
multiplier form; responses of the price level are percentage deviations from
the "unshocked" path.
Columns (1)-(4) assume a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 1)=2; columns
(5), (6) and (7), (8) assume labor supply elasticities of 1)=0.1 and 1)=00,
respectively.
Columns (1), (5), (7) assume flexible prices and wages; column (2):
sticky prices, flexible wages; column (3): flexible prices, sticky wages;
columns (4), (6) and (8) assume sticky prices and sticky wages (average
duration between price and wage changes, in seller's currency: 4 periods);
N.B.: 1-J) and 1-J) are per-period probabilities of price and wage change, forp w
individual firm and individual labor type (average number of periods between
price and wage changes: 1/(1-J) ), 1/(1-J) ), respectively).p w
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Table 5. Model predictions: responses to increase in home government purchases
Y
(1)
C
(2)
I
(3)
NX
(4)
P
(5)
e
(6)
•Y
(7)
•C
(8)
•I
(9)
•P
(10)
'"["=00
Flexible prices & wages
0.71 -0.51 0.17 -0.05
0.73 -0.48 0.15 -0.04
0.80 -0.37 0.08 0.10
0.70
0.66
0.51
1.26
1.26
1.26
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.08
0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.06
-0.06
-0.10
(b) Sticky prices
.=0 1.40 -0.18
.=4 0.92 -0.37
'"["=00 0.80 -0.37
& wages: baseline
0.50 -0.14 0.25
0.22 -0.05 0.51
0.08 0.01 0.51
structure
1.26 0.04
1.26 0.01
1.26 0.01
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.04 -0.11
0.02 -0.08
O. 01 -0.10
(c) Sticky prices
.=0 1.34 -0.11
.=4 0.91 -0.34
'"["=00 0.80 -0.37
& wages: Pricing
0.56 -0. 17 O. 15
0.24 -0.05 0.47
0.08 0.01 0.51
to Market
1.26 0.10
1. 26 O. 02
1.26 0.00
0.01
0.03
0.08
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.01
-0.04
-0.10
(d) Sticky
.=0 1. 39
.=4 1. 72
1:"=00 1.89
prices
0.02
0.21
0.49
& wages (baseline); government
0.24 -0.06 -0.04 1.11 0.00
0.37 -0.09 -0.29 1.11 0.01
0.21 0.02 -0.67 1.11 0.01
purchases raise productivity
0.09 0.02 -0.12
0.11 0.03 -0.16
0.18 0.02 -0.25
(e) Sticky prices & wages (baseline) ; home, foreign government purchases
co integrated
.=0 1.25 -0.11 0.43 -0.47 0.15 0.40 0.19 0.00 0.11 -0.01
.=4 0.80 -0.27 0.18 -0.36 0.35 0.40 0.13 -0. 03 0.06 0.04
1:;::00 0.43 -0.19 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.40 0.37 -0.10 0.05 0.13
Note: Model predictions are shown for an unexpected, permanent rise in
government purchases, in the home country (size of shock: 1% of pre-shock
national GDP). Columns labelled Y, C, I, NX, P, e show responses of home
output, consumption, investment, net exports, the home price level and of t~e
home currency price of foreign currency, respectively; columns labelled Y ,
." "C , I and P show responses of foreign output, consumption, investment and
price level.
Responses of output, consumption and investment are reported in
multiplier form; responses of the price level and the nominal exchange rate
are percentage deviations from the "unshocked" path. Responses of net exports
are expressed as percentage point differences compared to "baseline" paths
(net exports defined as (€IX-iAn)/( €IX+iAn) , where €IX and iAn are home country
exports and imports of goods and services, in home currency).
Rows labelled .=0, .=4 and .=00 show responses 0, 4 and 00 periods after
shock, respectively.
Panel (a): version of model with flexible prices and wages.
Panels (b)-(d) assume sticky prices and wages (average duration between
price and wage changes: 4 quarters); Panel (b): baseline structure (prices of
intermediate goods sticky in seller's currency); Panel (c): version of model
in which producers of intermediate goods engage in "pricing to market"
(stickiness of prices in buyer's currency); Panel (d): version of model in
which a 1% rise in home government purchases induces a 0.15% rise in home
total factor productivity; Panel (e): version of model in which home and
foreign government purchases (in logs) are co integrated:
... '* ..In(~t)=0.99'ln(~t_l)+0.11·ln(~t_l)+Ct' In(~t)=0.01·ln(~t_l)+0.99'ln(~t_l)+Ct·
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